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Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territories
Metis Association of the Northwest Territories

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"The Meaning of Underdevelopment"

Statement of Evidence of

MEL WATKINS

before the

MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY

YELLOWKNIFE, N.W.T.

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Mr. Puxley, in his evidence, explains the meaning of "Development". Mine is titled "The Meaning of Underdevelopment".

The Applicants, Arctic Gas and Foothills, assert in effect that the proposed gas pipeline provides a new opportunity for northern native people. The form that opportunity is alleged to take is the increased potential for wage-employment. They point to the extent of present unemployment among native people as evidence of the need for this opportunity, though they presumably overestimate this to the same extent as they underestimate the number of active hunters, fishers and trappers. In any event, they have some difficulty squaring this latter assertion with the extent of prior job-creating projects, notably in mining, but resolve the matter by insisting that the pipeline will constitute a break with the past. They emphasize that the jobs created in the operations phase, but not of course in the construction phase, will be permanent rather than transitory -- though, again, they beg the question of how this is different from mining, as well as the question of how permanent is permanent. Finally, they appeal to the training program. They are right to do this, since it would appear to be the only novel feature of the pipeline relative to prior development, though it is certainly a moot point whether such a modest program can reasonably bear the weight of constituting a break with the past.

Beyond such specifics, the Applicants further assert that to the extent that there are problems, or "costs", they, or the Government, will minimize them or otherwise deal with them. What is being asserted, then, is good intentions on the part of corporations and the government.

Next, the Applicants assert their respect for native land claims, and urge both the native organizations and the government to settle them so that their projects can proceed. They appear to assert that a pipeline prior to a land settlement will not prejudice

At the same time, we can speak to the positive assertions of the Dene: that they own 450,000 square miles of land; that their title to the land should be recognized rather than extinguished; that their aboriginal and human rights transcend property rights to include political rights, namely, the right to self-determination as a nation; that their desire for economic independence can be met by creating alternative community-based economic development under their control; that further development, and particularly the proposed pipeline, threatens gravely to prejudice the land claim by eroding their aboriginal and human rights.

Past and Present Development

The first notion of which we should disabuse ourselves is that what the Applicants have in mind for the North is novel from any historical perspective. Quite the contrary. The history of Canada, as written by the greatest of our historians, is as a succession of staple exports from successive geographic frontiers to serve the needs of more advanced industrial areas. The great export commodities have been fish, fur, square timber, lumber, wheat, pulp and paper, minerals, and oil and gas. The consequences for Canada have been profound:

> "Energy has been directed toward the exploitation of staple products and the tendency has been cumulative...Energy in the colony was drawn into the production of the staple commodity both directly and indirectly. Population was involved directly in the production of the staple and indirectly in the production of facilities promoting production. Agriculture, industry, transportation, trade, finance, and governmental activities tend to become subordinate to the production of the staple for a more highly specialized manufacturing community." (H.A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada)

And again:

> "Concentration on the production of staples for export to more highly industrialized areas in Europe and later in the United States had broad implications for the Canadian economic, political and social structure. Each staple in its turn left its stamp, and the shift to new staples invariably produced periods of crises in which adjustments in the old

> structure were painfully made and a new pattern created in relation to a new staple. (Innis, Empire and Communication)

The methodology of this so-called "staples approach" is directly helpful to us in considering the matter of "impact" which is centrally before this Inquiry. The impact of the proposed pipeline is simply the "stamp" of the oil and gas industry on Canada in general and the North in particular. The North is experiencing "the shift to a new staple"; the result is a "period of crisis" and of "painful adjustments".

What is the impact of a staple? Firstly, all of the staple trades have in common a bias towards serving the needs of more advanced metropolitan areas -- once France, then Britain and now the United States. This is clearly relevant when we are told, as in the present case, that the Dene interest must yield to the higher national interest. Not only is the hinterland interest being made subservient to the national interest, but by some sleight-of-hand the national interest is equated with the metropolitan interest. Secondly, each staple leaves its particular stamp. Two great staple trades have dominated the North, the fur trade and now, increasingly, minerals (mining and petroleum, the economic characteristics of which are the same, that is, the highly capital-intensive exploitation of non-renewable resources). These two staples have had profoundly different impacts on native people.

But first we need to retreat for a moment and see how the aboriginal people fit, in the most fundamental sense, into this approach to the story of Canadian development, past and present. Innis makes the essential point, at least implicitly, when he writes "Fundamentall the civilization of North America is the civilization of Europe...", and again "Canada has remained fundamentally a product of Europe". The Indian way-of-life, indeed the Indian himself, has been swept

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aside. Only in the era of the fur trade was the Indian functional to the Euro-Canadian, and everywhere the fur trade retreated in the face of settlement and was ultimately obliterated by it. The fate of the Indian was simply to become irrelevant. It is that fate, which was visited upon the Indian as the whiteman's frontier moved inexorably west and north, that now faces the Dane. Today native people are the majority in the N.W.T. but, of course, that has always been true initially in each of the successive frontiers.

The most dramatic demonstration of this functional irrelevance of the Indian is to be found in the very terminology that historians use to characterize Canada -- and other like cases, such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Their aboriginal populations notwithstanding, they are called "empty lands" or "areas of recent settlement" or "new Countries" or "undeveloped areas" -- or simply "the frontier". Their histories can be written, and are written, as the story of successive waves of white settlers exploiting new frontiers and transplanting European institutions. The resistance of the Indian -- for there has been resistance at every step -- becomes, in the history books little more than a lengthy footnote to the main story. The Riel uprising is crushed, Riel is hanged, and he casts his long shadow over subsequent history, as Professor Page reminded us, not because he was a native resistance leader but because he was a Catholic.

There is, then, an awful truth about the manner in which this country was born, and has since been successively rejuvenated. We cannot change that history, but we can learn from it and resolve "never again". Put differently, the exigencies of staple production must make allowance, here in the North, for the first time, for the reality of native rights; unless that is done, nothing will really change.

Let us now look briefly at the specific and differing impacts of fur and minerals as staples. To begin, there is the theoretical question of the mechanisms by which a particular staple leaves its stamp. It is clear from the quotations from Innis that these are pervasive, but at least with respect to the specifically economic mechanisms -- which, as it happens, are central -- they can be broken down by focussing on the actual mode of staple production and the linkages to other sectors of the economy.

The mode of production can be understood as the particular mix of factors of production -- of land (that is, natural resources), labour and capital -- used to produce the staple within, at any moment of time, a given technological and institutional framework. The linkages are the spread effects from the staple sector to other sectors of the economy, and particularly the local economy, through the market mechanism. They can be conveniently classified as three-fold: forward linkage, that is, further processing of the staple; backward linkage, that is, the production of inputs including capital goods for use in production of the staple; and final demand linkage, that is, the spending of the income received by the commodity producers or workers on consumer goods. In each case, the stronger the linkages, the greater the income generated in the local economy -- or, in the language of the economist, the higher the multiplier.

The prosecution of the fur trade depended, at least initially in each region into which the trade expanded, on the Indian as fur-gatherer. As such the Indian was a commodity producer, not a wage-earner, and the fur trade was literally a trade, or a commercial activity, not an industrial activity. The Indian became dependent to the extent that he became vulnerable to the exigencies of the trade, but he did not have to make two critical and traumatic adjust-

ments that result from imposed industrialization. Firstly, he did not have to become a wage-earner, and secondly, which is really the opposite side of the coin, he did not have to yield up his ownership of the land. To put the matter differently, neither his labour-time nor his land had to become themselves marketable commodities.

This point is of the first importance. For the student of economic history in general, no theme is so compelling as the process by which land-bound man -- typically agrarian but sometimes nomadic -- is turned, against his will, into industrial man. In general, it has not been a voluntary process, the mere offering of another option as the Applicants like to phrase it. Rather, the tendency has been for people to be pushed off the land or to have others sell it from beneath their feet. To turn land-bound people into landless wage-earners has typically involved coercion.

(One reaction to the initial trauma of the imposed wage-economy -- and it is one of which the Applicants are not guiltless -- is to conclude that if some wage-employment leaves many problems in its wake, the solution is to accelerate change so as to get more wage-employment. It might be called the "shock-treatment" approach to development. It fits into a general class of behaviour which E.F. Schumacher calls the tendency "to try and cure a disease by intensifying its causes.")

Now mineral production (including petroleum) is an industry not a trade, and it needs both rights to the use of land and people who will work for a wage. The Hudson's Bay Company, as a fur-trading company, did not need to own the land; indeed, it was in its interest to let the Indians own the land, the better to trap on it, and to discourage white settlement. Only when settlement overrode the fur trade, or promised imminently to do so, as it did in the West, did the Bay Company see fit to transform

itself into a real-estate company and to pretend, successfully as it turned out, that it owned Indian land and was entitled to compensation rather than the Indians.

But for the mining and petroleum companies, no such ambiguity is tolerable. Ownership arrangements with respect to the land must be such that they have a clear right to take minerals from under the land and transport minerals over the land. Hence, in the context of the present situation, they act on the assumption that the land is not Dene land, but Crown land, and if that is not so now it should be made so by a land settlement that extinguishes aboriginal title; the land, then, either is or must become Crown land, and the companies know full well the propensity of the Crown to let them extract resources. Furthermore, since "land" is simply a commodity, should the Dene perchance own some land that is needed -- either because title has not been resolved or because property rights have been vested with the Dene as part of a land settlement -- the companies reply that they can buy it, and should the Dene be unwilling to sell, the companies say that they can, with the help of the Crown, expropriate it.

This helps us to understand what a "land settlement" must necessarily mean to the industry, namely, extinguishing native title to the land or, as a minimum, limiting any recognition of aboriginal rights to property rights subject to expropriation, so as to remove an impediment to industrial activity.

The industry needs labour as well, but here we do not need to be cynical to see that Dene labour is hardly so essential as Dene land. Non-native labour is generally readily available from the South -- and this is particularly so now given the extent of unemployment -- and has the advantage that it is not "raw" labour but trained and disciplined labour. The record of the mining industry, or of the Imperial Oil refinery at Norman Wells, in this regard, namely, their failure over long periods of time to employ native labour and then mostly in the most menial and casual occupations

is sufficient demonstration of how the economics of the matter works. True, the government now insists on the employment of native labour, and industry is generally compliant -- in part because much of the training costs are paid by the government -- but the motives involved are at best mixed. It is good public relations for both government and industry, and in general has more to do with politics than with economics. And there are incidental advantages. To the extent it works, it means less native use of the land, relative to what would otherwise be the case, and hence can be alleged to diminish the potency of a land claim based on land-use (though not, of course, the possessory rights that flow from land-occupancy since time immemorial). For the government, the whole scheme can to some extent be seen as a substitute for welfare. When all is said and done, what is involved for the Indian is a swap -- a job in the wage-economy for abandoning and yielding up the land. We need to have only the slightest knowledge of the value of the natural resources of the North to the companies to know what an unequal bargain that is for the Dene.

We can get some idea of that value by enquiring about the role of capital and the nature of its return, and a closely related matter, namely, who gets the return to "land", or what economists call "economic rent". Up to a point, the matter is straightforward. Under the market system, the providers of capital receive dividends and interest. All we need add is that the owners of this capital may reside outside the region -- as they clearly do in the cases of both the fur trade and mineral production in the North -- and in that case no benefit therefrom accrues to the residents of the region.

But what if staple production yields profits above and beyond those necessary to service capital? This is not a hypothetical matter, but is rather to be expected in the nature of the case. The main reason is that staple production necessarily means exploitation of natural resources, or of "land", and since the latter is scarce, it is likely to command its own reward. The critical question then

becomes who gets the reward, or who appropriates the rents. Logic suggests that the answer is the owner of the land. If, as is alleged here in the North, the Crown owns the land, then it should get the rents, and that is a rationale for royalties and other forms of taxation of the resource industries. If the Crown fails to appropriate the rents -- as it largely does in the North and as it apparently intends to continue doing in the future -- they are transformed into "super-profits" and are appropriated by the owners of the capital or, in effect, the corporation itself for purposes of re-investment. There is, however, no reason to expect that they will be re-invested within the staple-producing region which generated them, and every reason to expect that they will not be re-invested in the region in other activities that serve local priorities. What tends to happen, then, is that the return to capital and to land leaves the region; all that remains is the return to labour, and that only to the extent it is resident labour.

To cast the Dene simply as wage-earners, as the Applicants do, is then not only to cast them in a role they may not want, but to deny them their role as the land-owner who should be entitled to appropriate the rents from projects which they choose to let proceed on their land. That denial is critical, for it means that the once-and-for-all rents generated within the region, from non-renewable resources that are in due course depleted, are ultimately re-invested at the behest of the corporation outside the region, rather than being re-invested within the region, by the people themselves, in activities based on renewable resources that could survive after the non-renewable resources are exhausted.

The general point has been powerfully made by Eric Kierans in his Report on Natural Resources Policy in Manitoba:

> "Resource rich nations that continually yield up the value of their wealth in return for the labour employed in its exploitation will never be more than resource nations. They lose the opportunity to form their own capital, capital which will enable them to break out of that very reliance on their resource base and reduce their dependence on foreign investment...To be satisfied with the new jobs created and to forego the surpluses and profits inherent in the development of its own endowment is hardly the mark of a strong and mature government. It accepts the role of 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for its people when they are capable of much more. That role provides wages and salaries and little else...A developing nation, a province or a colony may be rich in the beginning but when that wealth is depleted through the poverty of its policies, nothing remains of the original endowment but the instability, dissatisfaction and political unrest arising from poorly conceived policies...The priorities of the global corporation are not the priorities of the people whose resources, with the urging of governments, they have appropriated...A province should use the value of its exhaustible resources to finance the sectors of its economy that promise continuing economic activity, employment and development in the future."

In this respect, the oil industry is admittedly no different from the fur trade. The Hudson's Bay Company appropriated such enormous surpluses from the fur trade that it is now a major retailer, real-estate developer, and shareholder in the oil and gas industry. Indeed, beyond that, the fortunes that originated in the fur trade went on to spawn yet greater fortunes in banking and railways. Of what benefit has this been to the northern natives who produced the fur?

When the resource is non-renewable, as it is for mining and oil and gas, the major legacy of failing to keep the surpluses in the region to seed other activities is the well-known Canadian phenomenon of the ghosttown. As Northrop Frye observed in his recent Images of Canada television special on the CBC, "Canada is full of ghost towns: visible ruins unparalleled in Europe." The ghost town

symbolizes everything that the native people, as the long-term residents of the North, have to fear from the present mode of staple production, for by then who knows what cumulative damage will have been done to their land and its ability to support them?

There is also, as noted above, the matter of linkages of the staple sector to other sectors of the local economy. None of these linkages operate so as to create much economic activity in the North beyond the primary sector itself, and there is little reason to expect this to change. The primary product tends to be exported in a relatively unprocessed form, and there is a high propensity to import both capital goods and consumer goods. Rather, the linkages tend to generate economic activity in southern Canada, the U.S., and elsewhere, thereby creating benefits outside the North. (This does not mean that there is necessarily a net benefit to southern Canadians. Whether or not there is depends as well on the effects of frontier development on primary product prices, and hence indirectly on the prices of other commodities embodying the primary product. If the price of the staple rises to make frontier production possible, this will lower the real incomes of those who, directly or indirectly, consume the staple. This phenomenon is clearly relevant with respect to high-cost northern oil and gas and very probably makes the net benefit to the great majority of southern Canadians negative.) Predictably, the tactic of the businessmen and government of the staple-exporting region is to attempt to increase the linkages within the region. Whatever crumbs they achieve by this strategy are, of course, necessarily obtained by their having to opt wholeheartedly for continuing staple production. Hence, it is no surprise that local business interests in the North are solidly behind the pipeline, and that the Territorial Government conceives of Indian economic development as helping the Dene to get a piece of the action that will be generated in other sectors by the pipeline -- in spite of the fact that the latter has about it something of the aura of asking the condemned man to take up rope manufacturing.

Nor can it be assumed that an existing local enterprise will necessarily reap any benefit at all from a resource boom; it may even be left worse off. In his testimony before this Inquiry at the community hearing in Fort Resolution, Father Manez gave no less than four examples for that community alone -- in the fur business, river transportation, sawmilling and commercial fishing -- where existing native involvement was pushed aside by subsequent rounds of activity. Some of those awaiting the pipeline will experience not a linkage effect but a boomerang effect.

It was noted at the beginning of this analytical discourse that staple production takes place within a framework of technology and institutions. These are not ordained from on high, but are man-made; nevertheless, for the staple-producing region they are largely imposed, being created and controlled by outside interests. This is very clear today in the mineral sector of the North, where the technology is highly capital-intensive and a small number of large companies are dominant. Insofar as the technology is difficult to alter, the message for local people, and above all for the Dene as the permanent residents, is, again, not to be satisfied with merely being wage-earners in the mineral sector, but rather to focus on the rents which otherwise accrue to capital and are drained away. Insofar as the corporations, as the dominant institutions, are difficult to alter, and the government is an alien institution subservient to their needs, the relevant message for the Dene is to create a new institutional framework within the North under the control of the Dene to which these entities must adapt.

Large-scale resource projects are said by their proponents to create "development". In fact, for native people what has resulted is properly characterized as "underdevelopment". The process of under-development permits of a reasonably precise definition, namely, the suppression, or blockage, of potential sustained economic development geared to local human needs. The primary mechanism by which local

development is suppressed is by the outward drain of economic surplus from the region. The most significant loss from the failure to retain surplus is the destruction of local self-determination.

Let no-one doubt that the outflow of income generated in the North is large. This is evident from an examination of the social accounts of the North which has been done by John Palmer of Indian and Northern Affairs for the period 1967 to 1970. In 1970, Gross National Product per capita for all of Canada was $3,866, while Gross Domestic Product per capita for the N.W.T. (which is conceptually virtually the same as Canadian GNP) was much higher at $5,311. Now the high figure for the North is because GDP includes all income originating in the North, and hence includes non-resident earnings of both individuals and corporations, but that only demonstrates the extent to which wealth is in fact created in the North but drained out as wages and salaries to southerners and cash flow from Northern businesses to southern interests. In 1970, of GDP for <u>both</u> Territories of $266.1 million, $80.4 million was not retained in the North, $32.2 million going out as wages and salaries and $48.2 million as business cash flow.

Other comparisons are possible for the single year 1969. Per capita personal income (the income actually received by persons) was $2,915 for all Canadians, approximately $1,100 for Treaty Indians and Inuit of the N.W.T., and approximately $3,000 for other residents of the N.W.T. Total native personal income (with native defined, by those who collected the data, as Treaty Indians and Inuit) is estimated as $20.5 million in 1969 -- though this is clearly too low because of an underestimate of the value of country food. In that same year, the gross return on capital (before tax) in the mining sector in the N.W.T. was $37.4 million, of which only $4.6 million was retained in the North. Arvin Jelliss' rent estimates for the producing mines of the N.W.T. show economic rents proper -- after allowing for a 15 per cent return on capital, net of taxes and royalties -- of $15.9 million in 1970 (and very much higher in 1973 and 1974).

(These figures show, incidentally, that the statement made by Dr. Tom Espic, then Director of Economic Development for the Territorial Government, in the overview hearings that "The most dramatic disparity in Canada today is that separating the people of the Northwest Territories from other Canadians" is simply not true. What the data does show is that the most dramatic disparity in Canada today is that separating native people from other Canadians, and that this shows up in the North as a disparity between natives and whites within the North, and not as a disparity between all "Northerners" and other Canadians. In other words, the basic disparity is ethnic, not regional.)

The ultimate hallmark of underdevelopment is marginality. Economically it manifests itself as poverty, unemployment and welfare. (Rather than seeing welfare as "charity", we should appreciate its hidden dimensions. For the Dene, it avoids integration into the wage economy and is therefore a form of resistance. For the dominant society, it is something it can afford, for there are not that many Dene, and the long-run effect of welfare, to the extent it demoralizes and degrades people, discourages concerted use of the land, and thus helps to dispossess the Dene of their land). Socially, it manifests itself in alcoholism, family breakdown and suicide. Politically, it manifests itself in feelings of hopelessness and apathy.

The Dene have so far been spared the fullness of that fate; they are, as the Applicants like to say, in a state of transition. But the direction of history is clear. It has recently been succintly summarized by the anthropologist Dr. Peter Douglas Elias:

> "...Indian socio-economic phenomena must be studied within the historic and contemporary framework of the development of industrial, class-capitalist Canada. With the passage of time, Canada tended to acquire the 'typical' characteristics of class-capitalist society. The producers, in this case the Native people of Canada, were separated from the means of production, embodied, essentially, in the land and the products of the land. The means of production became concentrated and monopolized in the hands of a single social class, and natives became a class owning no possessions and,

> ultimately, having no exchangeable commodity other than labour. Even this 'typical' model of capitalist development was surpassed by natives becoming a permanently underemployed class subsisting on social assistance...An examination of the history of native and white contact reveals the processes that culminated in the total integration of Native peoples into contemporary Canadian society as permanent members of the underclass."

Hugh Brody tells us that the process is at work today with respect to the native people of the Eastern Arctic:

> "The most recent trends are pushing native people increasingly towards the lowest and least certain rung on the national class ladder: if separated from his own means of production and unable to have a sure relationship to the intruders' means of production, the Eskimo -- like many Canadian and American Indians before him -- will be turned into a migrant worker, a casual labourer, and -- as this lumpenproletarian condition develops -- prostitute, petty thief and beggar. Abundant signs of this course of events are already visible."

It must be insisted upon that the purpose of northern native land claims is neither more nor less than to subvert this terrible historic process.

It is important to understand as well that this way of analyzing the condition of native people is very different from those who insist, explicitly or implicitly, that the reality we are observing, particularly here in the North, is a "dual economy". According to this view, the North is a two-sector economy, consisting of a "modern" sector and a "traditional" sector, and these two sectors are substantially separate. The "modern" sector is seen as essentially an "enclave", where "development" takes place, while the "traditional" sector is stagnant and full of problems, and is not experiencing the benefits of "development". The logic of this position is that the solution lies in moving people out of the "traditional" sector and into the "modern" sector. The transition, though painful, is necessary. At the end of the road -- or in this case, at the end of

the pipeline -- what will be created is a one-sector "modern" economy with everybody experiencing the benefits of "development".

The thrust of my argument is very different. The concept of dual economy is not helpful in analyzing the history of the Mackenzie District either in the era of the fur trade or in the recent, and present, era of mineral production. In the past, when the fur trade was dominant the economy was a one-sector native economy with trapping commercialized. As Professor Asch has shown, the Dene benefited, though at the long-run cost of dependency. The moral seems clear: had the Dene controlled the fur trade, rather than the Bay Company, tendencies to "mining" and consequent depletion could have been curtailed; surpluses could have been kept in the region to permit of more diversified development around renewable resources, rather than being used to build major edifices in Winnipeg and Toronto; and white trappers -- who became an increasingly serious problem for the Dene in this century, as Father Fumoleau shows -- could have been excluded, assuming the political rights of the native majority were allowed to express themselves.

Today the economy is a two-sector economy with the mineral sector added to the pre-existing one-sector economy. But the two sectors are anything but separate. Rather, the operation of the "new" sector works, through a variety of mechanisms, to underdevelop the "old" sector. The economic surplus generated by the "new" sector is either used to generate further activity in the "new" sector or is drained out of the region; none even "trickles down" to the "old" sector. The white settlers attracted by the "new" sector impose alien institutions and pre-empt the power of the native people -- as a previous panel has shown; the native people experience degradation and anomie.

Again, there would seem to be a clear moral: if non-renewable resource exploitation is to continue, then instead of integrating the Dene into a one-sector economy -- which they say they do not want and which does not appear to have worked elsewhere in Canada -- what should be considered is creating a two-sector economy which has the real promise of being beneficial to the Dene. That is, instead of blithely assuming that a dual economy exists today -- but should be encouraged to wither away in the long-run -- we should see that what could be created is a two-sector economy where the two sectors would co-exist harmoniously. That would require us to look carefully at the means by which the present mechanisms of under-development could be turned into mechanisms of development.

The conclusion of this section of the evidence is that staple production, by its inherent nature, brings into play powerful structural and determinative factors. The inference is that these structural tendencies can be broken only by new institutional arrangements that permit of genuine development.

Corporate and Governmental Performance

Realistically, building a pipeline creates problems; to some extent the Applicants concede this, though there is an understandable tendency to underestimate them. But no matter, we are told, they will do their best, and the rest can be left to the benevolence of Government.

The truth of the matter is that the companies will do little beyond what the Government requires them to do. The reason is simple: the role of the corporation is to maximize its profits, and it might even get into trouble with its shareholders -- particularly when the latter is an externally-based parent company -- were it not diligently to do so. The companies define their sphere of activity narrowly -- production, transportation, marketing and financing of goods and services -- and if these activities create costs for others, these are "externalities" which are not relevant in calculating profit,

and hence in making decisions expect to the extent that the companies are constrained by government through law and regulation. Put differently, the activities of the corporations generate income, which is a "private benefit", but any costs imposed on others are "social costs" and are left to be borne by the individuals and groups concerned or to be borne on their behalf by the government.

The ability of the corporation to single-mindedly pursue its narrow objective is further enhanced by its structure. It is a hierarchical and authoritarian institution . A distinguished student of human liberty, Professor Edgar Friedenberg, puts it this way:

> "The large corporation has proved itself to be more nearly immune to the democratic process than any other major social institution of our time...All the egalitarian assumptions of the democratic process are openly negated in the conduct of the corporation: the negation is built into its structure (i.e., employees have no voice in setting its policies and very little in determining its day-to-day operation). Moreover, this fact is accepted as perfectly legitimate."

And Friedenberg, who sees the state itself as a significant threat to liberty, nevertheless concludes:

> "Granted the choice between being governed by the demands of a corporation and those of a democratic state whose policies are, in any case, largely determined by corporate demands, I would still choose the national state. Corporations are probably too lacking in diversity, and moral commitment, too rational to be trusted to encompass the whole of life as the state must."

Fundamental to the undemocratic nature of the corporation, particularly in its present multinational form, is its centralization of decision-making. The late Stephen Hymer, a leading authority on the multinational corporation, wrote:

> "Although the multinational corporation spreads production over the world, it concentrates coordination and planning in key cities and preserves power and income for the priviledged."

While corporations do not always do what they are told by governments to do, it can be easily demonstrated that theyare not inclined to be better corporate citizens than governments, no matter how reactionary, require them to be. The evidence by the Churches on the Brazilian Amazon and the Canadian North showed that a significant number of well-known Canadian companies, some of which operate here in the North, operate in Brazil, notwithstanding harsh policies toward aboriginal people bordering on the genocidal -- and not to speak of a military junta and widespread repression. In Chile, the use of torture as an instrument of state-policy is one of the horrors of the contemporary world, but it has not stopped Falconbridge, Noranda, Amoco and Cominco from pursuing business as usual -- and three of these companies are major operators in the North, while Noranda is trying to establish a presence. Falconbridge also operates in the Union of South Africa, Southwest Africa or Namibia, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); the racial policies of these countries are well-known, with the U.N. having imposed sanctions against Rhodesia and the South African occupation of Namibia having been declared illegal by the International Court of Justice and the U.N. Nor does this list have to be confined to the mineral sector; the Hudson's Bay Company is also in Namibia -- as the major participan in the trade in karakul fur -- in defiance of th international polity.

These are the extremities of corporate irresponsibility, but they have the virtue of highlighting the problem. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Dene should not place a blind trust in the companies. They are no better than the institutional framework of government policy within which they operate; indeed, worse than that, there is little evidence to suggest that they attempt to get

bad governments to be better, and worst of all, there is considerable evidence to suggest a willingness to shore up corrupt or reactionary regimes.

Nor is that the end of the matter, for the corporations have at least some capacity to influence governments, and governments, notwithstanding their professed pursuit of the public interest, may sometimes adopt a more pro-development stance with respect to a particular country, or region therein, than do the companies which tend to have global options.

There is reason to believe that the Applicants and the companies which make up their consortia are not without influence on government. Professor Dosman's book in particular -- and host of other books on the petroleum industry in general -- certainly leaves one with that impression. Specifically, it is of more than passing interest that the leading student of the contemporary Canadian Establishment, Peter C. Newman, lists Mr. William Wilder, Chairman of Arctic Gas, as one of a handful of businessmen, or "senior business ambassadors", with whom Prime Minister Trudeau has "friendly relations", and with whom he has dined privately in the search for economic advice. Newman tells us as well that Mr. Robert Blair, President of Foothills, "has suddenly emerged as Alberta's most important businessman", while the press is replete with hints as to the close working relationship of Mr. Blair's Alberta Gas Trunk with the Lougheed Government.

As to the pro-development policies of the Canadian Government with respect to the North, we have the detailed documentation of the inner workings of the Government as disclosed by Professor Dosman. It leaves no doubt that the Government is advance-man as well as barker for the Northern Oil and Gas Play. Certainly, there is no known case of the companies not getting their way on a matter of major importance.

The issue central to the native people is, of course, their land

claims. Here Dosman documents very precisely that the Government knowingly and willfully decided to proceed with the gas pipeline before settling native land claims. Its hopes for a quick pipeline were dashed, because of events in the U.S., but it stuck to this position in spite of this...and in spite of the willingness of the U.S. Government to settle with the Alaskan native people...and in spite of the formation in 1971-72 of COPE, the Indian Brotherhood of the N.W.T. and ITC, all insisting that there were unsettled land rights. The decision of Mr. Justice Morrow in the caveat case was a blow to the Government's policy of deceit, says Dosman, and led to some softening, but "Indian Affairs and Northern Development still held back on the promise of a land settlement prior to pipeline construction". It still does.

On the basis of the sorry record of corporations and governments in the North, it does not seem unreasonable for the Dene to have their doubts about stated good intentions. Indeed, given the performance of corporations and government, the Dene cannot sensibly rely on them to protect the Dene interest. They would appear to have no alternative but to assume themselves a very significant amount of political control -- although surely to hunt, fish and trap is a more wholesome activity. If they could establish a Dene authority over Dene land -- within the constitutional framework of Canada, which Professor Russell has indicated is both possible and desirable -- then they would be in a position to bargain directly with those companies which wished to enter their land. Out of that process could come the "terms and conditions" under which a project could proceed; in the absence of a bargain being struck, the project could not proceed. This is indeed to place a heavy burden and responsibility on the Dene -- and one not without its continuing hazards for the Dene themselves in the face of companies which possess great power -- but the right to determine one's own future is a fundamental right and the eternal vigilance needed to exercise it on a day-to-day basis could be the key to the collective survival of the Dene and their continuing development as a people.

The Land Claim and Alternative Development

The problem that some people may have, including perhaps the Applicants, in understanding the nature and extent of the land claim, is that both the word "land" and the word "claim" are somewhat misleading. To use the word "claim" is to imply that native people are claiming their homeland and rights; while the erosions of colonialism are real, we should at least say reclaim. But perhaps the best word is "declaration" (as in Dene Declaration), that is, the Dene are declaring their rights; my dictionary gives as the meaning of declare "make known, proclaim publicly", that is, it is something the declarant already knows.

To the Euro-Canadian, the word "land" conjures up property rights, and property means something that is marketable and subject to expropriation. Clearly the word "land" means much more than that to the Dene and, specifically, in Euro-Canadian language, includes rights of control or political rights. The collective expression of political rights is what we would customarily call "self-determination". By "land claim", then, the Dene apparently mean "a declaration of the right to self-determination"; thus the Dene Declaration is the central statement of their claim.

Now as Professor Saul argued, self-determination is a many-faceted phenomenon, with different dimensions reinforcing each other. Thus, significant economic independence, while it cannot in itself be sufficient, is nevertheless necessary for self-determination. Indeed, insofar as the Dene cannot achieve political independence -- for they accept that they are part of Canada -- the degree of economic independence needed may become that much more important.

What is here called "economic independence" is what the Dene call "alternative development". That term can be understood to mean an "alternative" to the "development" of the non-renewable resource sector, which, in fact, creates underdevelopment for native people. Along the lines suggested earlier, it could be seen as meaning a

two-sector economy -- of a non-renewable resource sector under white ownership but subject to Dene control, and a renewable resource sector under Dene ownership and control.

Take the renewable resource sector first. A strong, indeed compelling case can surely be made for exclusive Dene rights in this sector, not only to hunt, fish and trap but with respect to the whole area of game management -- indeed, of all renewable resource management including forests and water; while non-Dene northern residents and the bureaucracy of the Territorial Government might be expected to resist this logic, it could be acceptable to the developers, and the federal government, for whom the main chance is non-renewable resources. But there are hidden implications not only for the developers -- as we shall see directly -- but also for the Dene.

For the Dene, what would seem to be at issue is not only the protection of their traditional economy but the right, indeed the necessity, to create their own contemporary economy around renewable resources. Just as it is increasingly recognized that the genuine development of the Third World hinges on agrarian reform, on the modernization of agriculture to servedomestic needs, so the genuine development of the North presumably hinges on the modernization of the renewable resources sector by the Dene to serve Dene needs. Productivity must be improved and, given the extent both of present underemployment and the rapidity of growth of the native population, the sector must be expanded so that more people can be gainfully engaged in it. It would appear that the Dene prefer involvement in the renewable resource sector to involvement, at least on a full-time basis, in the non-renewable resource sector, but a restructuring of the renewable resource sector must take place so that it becomes a clearly viable sector in material terms. Given the government's obsession with the non-renewable resource sector to the virtual exclusion of all other considerations, such restructuring is, to say the least, unlikely to take place except in the context of a land settlement and its subsequent

implementation. In any event, it will hardly constitute Dene development unless it is done by the Dene themselves.

It would be a considerable advance to have the recognition of exclusive Dene rights to harvest and to manage renewable resources, but it would not be sufficient. There are two reasons why this is so, that is, there are at least two identifiable mechanisms of underdevelopment which impinge on the renewable resource sector from the non-renewable resource sector and which would have to be converted into mechanisms of development.

The first is that activity in the non-renewable resource sector does damage to the renewable resource base and thereby threatens the continuing viability of that sector. The Dene can only be effectively protected against this by having themselves the power to protect their land. Even the exclusive right to use the renewable resources will be of insufficient avail if the right is not protected. Hence, alternative development must include the right to control over the non-renewable resource sector so as to limit environmental degradation and competing uses to an extent that is tolerable to the Dene.

The second mechanism of underdevelopment is the failure of economic surplus generated in the non-renewabel resource sector to accrue to the benefit of the renewable resource sector. What is at issue here is not only the right of the land-owner to appropriate the rent, but the loss of the potential to create Dene development when that does not happen. Put more concretely, to create a viable Dene renewable resource sector requires both capital goods and Dene with both "traditional" and "modern" skills. Both of these, in turn, require money. So long as the money is made available under the whiteman's control -- whether it be so-called Indian economic development funds

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under government auspices, or whether it be the building and operating of schools that destroy all-around Dene skills -- then Dene development is a contradiction in terms. Hence, the right to alternative development must include the right to tax the non-renewable resource sector, or impose royalties thereon, so as to fund the Dene economy, and the Dene institutions, which will permit of continuing Dene development.

This is not to pretend to make a judgment about exactly how much rent should go to the Dene, but some principles can be laid down. Firstly, as previously noted, given the observed failure of the Government to come anywhere near to fully appropriating economic rents in the North and the apparent intention to continue to operate that way for the indefinite future, there is a good deal of room for the Dene to appropriate rents at no cost to the great majority of southern Canadians, who are not shareholders in the oil and mining industries, but solely at the cost of reducing the super-profits of the corporations. Secondly, the Dene would have the right to forego rent by vetoing projects, or short of that, compelling changes in them that would increase costs to the companies and hence lessen the rents available for appropriation. A specific variant on this -- which has received the tentative blessing of the Science Council -- would be to discourage new town sites, particularly for mines, and generally encourage the flying-in-and-out of personnel from the South; this would presumably increase the costs to the companies, but would not necessarily increase the true social costs which include large costs for infrastructure which are mostly not borne by the companies but rather by governments and individuals. Thirdly, if rents accruing to the Dene are to be justified by some criteria based on need -- that is, the Dene should get enough but not too much -- then the criteria implicit in this analysis are simply what is necessary both to provide capital for community-based economic development --

until it becomes viable and self-sustaining, and has created full employment in the communities -- and to permit the on-going subsidization of Dene institutions; if schools are included in the latter because the Dene were to so wish, then it should be borne in mind that there is no necessary net cost to society since the schools are now funded by the government rather than by the Dene themselves. A final observation on this third principle is to remind ourselves, as Harold Cardinal already has, that the Indian people have a tradition of sharing; in spite of statements sometimes made to the contrary, there is no evidence the Dene are asking for a "King's ransom".

A major theme of this evidence is that a concern with economic development compels us to concern ourselves with political control. In institutional terms this implies, in the content of a land settlement, both the right of the Dene to create their own institutions and the need to limit full political rights to long-term residents of the North; specifically, the logic of this evidence, though focussed on the economic, strongly supports a residency rule for participation in local and territorial elections such as the ten-year residency rule proposed by the native organizations.

Is it possible to say anything more about the probable nature of Dene economic development? Work in this area, which most come from the communities themselves is in its early stages, but a statement worked out at an Indian Brotherhood Workshop of Regional Field Coordinators in October 1974 is suggestive. It is entitled "What Does Development Mean for the Indian People of the Mackenzie District?", and it answers the question as follows:

1. It means development by the community rather than by outsiders. It means development by the community as a whole rather than by individuals within the community.

2. It means not participating, even as workers, in activites you cannot control. If such developments go ahead anyway (such as large resource developments), Indian people as owners of the resource should benefit from royalties, and the political rights of Indian people (which would be threatened by an influx of white woerks) should be protected by entrenching them as part of the land settlement.

3. It means getting expertise when it is needed in the form of short-term technical assistance without giving up ownership (even of the joint venture variety).

4. It means long-term planning and priorities (since its' impossible to do everything).

5. It means continuity with the past, by complementing and re-inforcing traditional pursuits, and by drawing on the community's experience.

6. It means communities relating to each other, regionally and for the Mackenzie District as a whole (for unit- means power).

7. It means a process which unites and builds up the community's sense of self and the sense of self of all its members.

8. It means that development is implemented in a way that fits the Indian way of doing things (which is not the same as the government's way or the companies' way).

9. It means learning by doing so that development becomes an on-going, self-reinforcing process.

10. It means greater economic independence and greater political autonomy.

11. It means maintaining an egalitarian and sharing society.

12. It means setting an example for Canada.

13. It means growth in Indian communities...not only economic development but cultural, social, political and spiritual development...and the sum is greater than the parts.

Finally, we might usefully contrast the intransigent position on the right of Northern native people, within Canada, to pursue their development as exemplified by Indian and Northern Affairs with the position of the Canadian government toward the people of the Third World as articulated by the President of CIDA. In an address to the Couchiching Conference last year, Mr. Paul Gerin-Lajoie referred to how, in the 1950s and '60s, it was thought that the way to create development

> "was to concentrate on capital-intensive projects in key economic sectors and on the creation of poles of growth, benefits of which would eventually trickle down to the population as a whole and to the more traditional sectors of economic activity. But this pehnomenon has not materialized...There is mounting concern that the benefits of economic growth have missed the small farmers, rural artisans and urban unemployed -- the poorest of the poor who remain without any cash income."

And later in the year, speaking in Vienna, he said:

> "After two decades of development recipes which have failed to change the world situation, there is growing awareness that development requires an overall philosophy and a worldwide approach. The increase in gross national product is no longer considered as the deus ex machina that would carry with it, for the advantage of the masses of poor people, benefits of improved food and nutrition, housing, health and education services, employment and fair distribution of income. These are now recognized as the very essence of development, to be pursued as a comprehensive and integrated set of goals within a context of collective cultural aspirations."

While there is very likely a considerable gap between the rhetoric and practice of CIDA, Indian and Northern Affairs would at least benefit from wider reading. For if I understand Mr. Gerin-Lajoie properly, a pipeline is not the way to create development; it would presumably not qualify for Canadian assistance if it were being built outside of Canada. The statement from the Brotherhood Workshop, in contrast, seems to be close to the spirit of Mr. Gerin-Lajoie's remarks.

The Public Interest and the Dene Interest

The most persistent argument used by developers, private and public, is that large-scale resource projects serve the "public interest". If the residents of the region where the project is to take place object, in the final analysis they are put down by appeal to the "public interest". This is justified by saying that the "national interest" must override the "regional interest", with the reality for contemporary large-scale energy resource projects being that the relevant "regional interest" is the "native interest". The native interest -- which is real -- is then disposed of either by saying, in effect, that it must, regretably, be overridden, or by asserting that in some long-run sense the two interests are really identical.

Yesterday in James Bay, the Cree were coerced into a settlement involving extinguishment of their aboriginal rights to the land in the name of the public interest. Today, the Dene are told that a pipeline may have to be built prior to a land settlement -- because it is in the public interest. Right across northern Canada, native people are having large projects pushed down their throats, with corporate executives and government officials telling them that "the greater good" must take precedence over the regional interest of a handful of people.

This is no new phenomenon, but rather has deep historic roots. Since the beginning, the Indian interest has been sacrificed on the alter of the public interest, or what Professor Ted Chamberlin calls the "common good" in his penetrating study of white attitudes toward North American natives, The Harrowing of Eden. He eloquently summarizes the use of this technique over the centuries:

> "It was for the common good that the western lands were opened up for settlement even as the eastern lands had been settled; it was for the common good that treaties were signed, and often broken, and that provision was made in these treaties for roads, way stations, trading houses and forts, which could be built at governmental whim on lands reserved for Indians; it was for the common good that rail and road links were established through Indian lands to link east and west; it was for the common good that Indian hunting and fishing rights, guaranteed by treaty or solemn promise, were revoked to make room for people, or things (such as dams) to serve people, or programs (such as conservationist schemes) to satisfy people; it was for the common good that Indians were herded like cattle, treated like children, swatted like flies, and guarantined like animals suspected of having rabies."

It happened that way, but it did not have to and should not have. But are there, in fact, any principles that can be enunciated -- applicable to a project like the proposed gas pipeline -- to resolve what some people persist in seeing as a cruel dilemma?

Let us return to the analysis in the first section of this evidence bearing on the so-called staples approach. Virtually without exception, the massive energy projects underway or planned for Northern Canada serve outside needs -- and by that I mean needs external to Canada. So the choice is not, in fact, simply between the national interest and the regional native interest. Typically, in this century, there is the overriding American, or continental, interest, and it cannot be simply assumed that what serves the American interest automatically serves the national interest. (In terms of the Applicants, Arctic Gas clearly serves, first and foremost, the American interest, since it wishes to transport natural

gas from one part of the United States to another part of the United States -- a kind of contemporary version of the Panama Canal. Foothills, properly viewed, serves the continental interest, since an alternative to its pipeline for some time at least -- and which could have been done some time ago -- is to eliminate exports of gas to the U.S.; furthermore, were it to get the government nod then, like Arctic Gas, it would have to go to bed with the same U.S.-controlled producing companies. Also, the Arctic Gas proposal, and now Foothill's Fairbanks Corridor proposal, appear to hinge on a treaty with the U.S. guaranteeing safe passage of American gas through Canada; the erosion of Canadian sovereignty implicit in such a treaty is reminiscent of the by-gone era of the DEW-line in the North.

A significant dimension of the choice, then is choosing between the interests of non-Canadians and the interests of native people who are Canadians; it is of the essence of the nature of the nation-state that it should be biased in favour of its own citizenry.

There is a further implication to the staples approach. It is not only the North -- as the "new frontier" -- which is driven by the imperatives of staple production. So too, after close to four centuries, is Canada as a whole. We cannot forever grow by expanding into new geographic frontiers, for we are running out of places to go -- and there is little merit in emulating the example of the U.S. after its frontier closed, circa 1890, which finally landed it in Vietnam. The time may not be too far distant when some considerable restructuring of the Canadian economy, away from its staple-export-bias to meeting the needs of Canadians to a greater extent within itself, will be necessary. In any event, it is long overdue, and the need for a humane approach to further Northern development is the best possible reason for beginning the task of restructuring now.

At the same time, there is also the growing realization that energy -- whether exported to the U.S. or used in Canada -- is being massively wasted; the important new book by Barry Commoner, The Poverty of Power, is devastating on this point. It would appear that the interests of the native people are being sacrificed for no better reason than that neither the U.S. (nor Canada) has anything even vaguely resembling a rational energy plan -- and, coincidentally,

it is the very developers of the projects who simultaneously use their political clout to prevent the working out of such a plan.

Just as evidently, there is growing concern about the environment, and the public interest in that area, properly perceived, will almost certainly be better served by the native people than it presently is by the corporations and the government. That is likely to be the case not only because the native people have a respect for the environment not found amongst those who are powerful in white society, but because, to quote Dr. Schumacher again:

> "It is moreover obvious that men organized in small units will take better care of their bit of land or other natural resources than anonymous companies or megalomaniac governments which pretend to themselves that the whole universe is their legitimate quarry."

-- bearing in mind, of course, that the bits are big in the North.

There is a danger, of course, of putting too fine a dress on these matters. For when all is said and done, "development" takes place because that is how developers make money. If a higher purpose is served, that is largely coincidental. Furthermore, the developers do their best to define the public interest, thereby improving their likelihood of serving it. Corporate advertising by the oil industry on the need for frontier resources, a kind of violence to the truth sandwiched between the real violence of Hockey Night in Canada, is a relevant case in point.

But even all this does not strike to the heart of the matter. Are there circumstances in which we are entitled to override the native interest? -- bearing in mind as well that this may not mean foregoing projects but rather significantly altering their structure and timing. I think not, for we must recognize what we are doing if we do that. If people of a fundamentally different culture say No to the demands of a dominant culture, and the dominant culture proceeds anyway, then what we are describing is, in the ordinary sense of the term, imperialism.

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In what possible sense can the "greater good" be served by such an act of coercion? What are those of us who are complicit in the act to do? Presumably we must either plead ignorance, or bear the guilt, or assert the rightness of oppression. But none of these can be said to leave us better off.

A major theme of my evidence has been that many native people in this country are in their present impoverished position because of what has been done to them in the past. We can specify the mechanisms of underdevelopment by which the damage has been done.

We can work out the means by which these mechanisms can be transformed into mechanisms of development. What excuse can there be for not doing it?

The Indian people, right across Canada, self-evidently need Indian economic development under Indian control. That does not mean a stark choice between either "traditional" activity or wage-employment with non-Indian controlled enterprises. As George Manuel has put it:

> "Countless numbers of Indian communities have rejected proposals offered to them under the guise of economic development that promised an uncertain number of menial jobs with no specified opportunities for advancement, in return for ninety-nine year leases and unpredicted amounts of pollution. This is not a cruel dilemma between moving in one direction or another. It is a choice between one kind of stagnatory povery and another."

There <u>is</u> a third way, the way of alternative development. And how do projects like the proposed gas pipeline contribute to that, directly here and indirectly elsewhere by example, unless the occasion of a large project affecting Indian land should first become the occasion for the working out of a new land settlement with Indian people? To start the pipeline prior to such a settlement would be to lose that once-and-for-all opportunity, and must be seen as intolerable.

Nor, as is implied above, is it only the Dene who will be the losers. It is evident from the southern hearings of this Inquiry that the struggle against the pipeline and for a just and equitable land claim for the Dene is a concern of all Indian people in Canada. Put differently, the issue is not merely between the alleged national interest and the Dene interest; it has also become one between the former and the interest of all aboriginal people in Canada. That is as it should be, but it must be understood that the damage that will be done by starting a pipeline before a land settlement is thereby made yet more intolerable.

There is yet another tactic of evasion, and that is to try to turn the native people into white people. "Integrate" them into the wage-economy, indeed, into the whole mores of white society; in fact, the former already implies much of the latter. The native interest is disposed of, literally, and all that is left is the public interest. It is, of course, the most insidious of solutions. It has been rejected again and again by the Indian people, which is sufficient reason for its abandonment.

Conclusion

The Dene assert that starting a pipeline prior to a land settlement would prejudice their land claim. It is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. The companies ask: how can we avoid prejudice? The answer, which is understandably rejected by them, is that their very presence here, before the Dene have reclaimed their historic rights, constitutes prejudice. They did not come with the consent of the Dene, so they should not be here. If they wish to be here, and to stay here, they must try to strike a bargain with the Dene. The role of the government is to let this happen, to give the Dene the space they need -- the geographic space and the political space -- knowing that what redounds to the benefit of its least prosperous citizens must ultimately redound to the prosperity of the democratic state.

APPENDIX A

WITNESS RESUME

MEL WATKINS

MELVILLE H. WATKINS

Present Position: Economic Consultant, Indian Brotherhood of the NWT.
Professor of Economics, University of Toronto
(on leave)

Education:
1952, Bachelor of Commerce, University of Toronto
1954-55, Postgraduate studies in economics
University of Toronto
1955-58, Postgraduate studies in economics,
Massachussetts Institute of Technology

Professional Experience:
1952-54, Price Waterhouse and Co., Toronto
1956-58, Instructor in Economics, MIT
University of Toronto, Dept. of Political Economy
1958, Lecturer
1962, Assistant Professor
1965, Associate Professor (with tenure)
1970, Professor
May 1966, Exchange Professor, Moscow State University
1967-68, Head of the Task Force on the Structure of Canadian Industry, Privy Council Office, Ottawa
March 1973, Gabrielson Lecturer on National Responsibilities in the World Economy, Colby College, Maine
May/June 1973, Teaching Master, Seneca College Mobile Arctic Program

Affiliations:
1966, Treasurer and Chairman of Finance Committee, International Teach-in
1966-67, Chairman, Governing Council of Rochdale College
1965-67, Treasurer, University League for Social Reform
1967-69, President, University League for Social Reform
1966-73, Editorial Board, The Canadian Forum
1969- Editorial Board, Journal of Canadian Studies
1969-70, President, Harold Innis Foundation
1969-71, Vice-President, Federal New Democratic Party
1971-73, Federal Council, NDP
1969-74, Steering Committee, National Waffle and Ontario Waffle
1970-74, Executive, Committee on Socialist Studies
1975-76, Panel of Public Enquiry into Northern Hydro Development, Interchurch Task Force on Northern Flooding

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